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INCOME TAXATION OF THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF
INTEREST-FREE LOANS
The use of interest-free loans' is prevalent in a wide variety of
situations, such as from a parent to a child to enable the child to
purchase a new home, from a professional athletic club to a star player
as compensation, or from a corporation to its majority shareholder for
personal expenses. In all of these situations under present case law,2
the recipient of an interest-free loan need not include the benefit of the
use of the money in his gross income, and thus receives what may be a
substantial benefit tax-free. The Internal Revenue Service, however,
challenges this result.3
The use of funds without an obligation to pay interest clearly con-
fers a valuable economic benefit to the borrower and is likely to in-
crease in popularity in response to the dramatic rise in interest rates.4
In reaching the conclusion that this benefit should be included in gross
income, and thus subject to income tax, this comment analyzes: first,
the seminal case of J Simpson Dean,5 in which the Tax Court held that
interest-free loans do not result in a taxable gain to the borrower;6 sec-
ond, recent Tax Court decisions that, while declining to overturn the
Dean rationale, have nonetheless limited its holding; and third, possi-
ble adverse tax consequences under current case law arising from the
excessive use of interest-free loans. Finally, legislation is proposed that
would require taxation of the benefit of an interest-free loan when the
loan could be characterized as compensation and included in income as
a fringe benefit, or when the loan is between a controlling shareholder
and his corporation and results in a distortion of income.
I. J S.IMPSON DEAN: WHEN AN ECONOMIC BENEFIT Is NOT
INCLUDED IN GROSS INCOME
The determination of a taxpayer's gross income forms the basis of
1. This comment's discussion of interest-free loans is equally applicable to low-interest
loans.
2. See notes 20-26 infra and accompanying text.
3. The Commissioner has not issued an acquiescence in the cases discussed in Part II,
infra, and maintains his position that the leading case in this area, J:. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C.
1083 (1961), was wrongly decided.
4. See Wall St. J., Mar. 19, 1980, at 2, col. 2 (prime rate raised to 19% by several major
banks; analysts predict 20% or higher rate possible).
5. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
6. Id at 1090.
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his tax liability.7 Gross income is defined broadly in section 618 of the
Internal Revenue Code as "all income from whatever source derived." 9
The United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld decisions
that give an all-inclusive scope to what may be included in gross in-
come and thus subject to income tax.'0 Despite this background of tax-
ing economic benefits received regardless of their form, there has been
a judicial reluctance to impose either gift or income tax consequences
on the benefit of either making or receiving interest-free loans.'1
J. Simpson Dean'2 was the first case in which the Tax Court con-
sidered whether the benefit received from an interest-free loan should
7. For a comprehensive analysis of the concept of gross income, see Lowndes, Current
Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 OHIOST. L.J. 151 (1964).
8. I.R.C. § 61 corresponds to § 39.22(a) of the 1939 Code. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 39.22(a), 53 Stat. 457. The legislative history of§ 61 indicates that while its language
has been simplified, the new section is as broad as the former. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1954). See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1954).
Citations to code sections are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise
noted.
9. I.R.C. § 61(a).
10. In Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945), the benefit derived from the bargain
purchase of stock through an employee stock option plan was held to be taxable income. Id
at 181-82. In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that § 22(a) of the 1939 Code was
"broad enough to include in taxable income any economic orfinancial beneft conferred on
the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected." Id at
181 (emphasis added).
In deciding whether money received as exemplary damages in a fraud action or as
punitive damages in an antitrust action is gross income, the Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) recognized the "intention of Congress to
tax all gains except those specifically exempted," id at 430, and held that money received
from the award of punitive or exemplary damages is taxable as income. Id at 430-31.
11. In Johnson v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966), the court found that
the benefit from parents' interest-free loans to their children was not subject to the gift tax.
Id at 77. The court stated that such interest-free loans did not defeat the purpose of the gift
tax laws, reasoning that the loans did not reduce the parents' estate because the parents had
no obligation to invest their money profitably. Id
More recently, in Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), a 'g 67 T.C.
1060 (1977), a partnership controlled by the taxpayer and his two brothers made loans total-
ing approximately 18 million dollars to a series of 24 trusts established for the partners'
children and other relatives. The court held that the making of an interest-free loan repay-
able on demand was not a transfer of property within the meaning of the gift tax statute
because the borrower had no legally protected right against the lender and the borrower's
use of the money was not an interest with an exchangeable value in that it could be recalled
at any time. Id at 239-40. The court indicated that a different result could occur if the loans
were for a fixed term and the foregone interest could be readily ascertained. Id at 241.
For a further analysis of the gift tax aspects of inter-family interest-free loans, see Ed-
wards, Tax Planning Possibilities of Crown, 50 J. TAX. 168 (1979); Note, Interest-Free Loans
and the Gft Tax: Crown v. Commissioner, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 903 (1977); Comment, G#1
Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 19 STAN. L. REv. 870 (1967).
12. 35 T.C. 1083 (1961).
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be taxed as income. During a two year period, Dean and his wife re-
ceived in excess of two million dollars in interest-free loans from the
Nemours Corporation, of which they were virtually the sole sharehold-
ers. The Commissioner contended that the Deans realized a taxable
economic benefit from these loans, equal to the interest they would
have paid had they borrowed the money in an arms-length transac-
tion.13 This contention was premised upon an analogy to several cases
in which courts had held that a stockholder's rent-free use of corporate
property may result in a taxable benefit. 4 The Tax Court rejected this
analogy and distinguished the situations by noting that had the user of
rent-free corporate property rented the property instead, his expense in
so doing would not have been deductible. On the other hand, had the
stockholder borrowed the money in an arms-length transaction, his in-
terest payments would have been deductible. 5 Thus, under the court's
reasoning, the determination of whether an economic benefit should be
included in gross income is dependent upon the availability of a deduc-
tion offsetting the benefit received.
The Commissioner did not appeal the Dean decision. Although
commentators have criticized Dean's holding as being overbroad, 6 lit-
tle judicial discussion regarding the tax consequences of interest-free
loans followed after Dean was decided.' 7 Relying on Dean, tax plan-
ners utilized interest-free loans to transfer economic benefits without a
corresponding recognition of income on the transfer. It was not until
twelve years later, in 1973, that the Commissioner issued a non-acqui-
escence to Dean,8 thereby giving notice of its intention to challenge the
case's holding. Accordingly, cases involving interest-free loans are now
coming before the Tax Court, and in a series of opinions the court has
13. Id at 1087.
14. Id. at 1089. E.g., Dean v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1951) (rental value
of corporation's house included as part of stockholder's gross income); Rodgers Dairy Co.,
14 T.C. 66 (1950) (rental value of corporation's automobile included as part of stockholder's
gross income); Paulina DuPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256 (1947) (rental value of corporation's house
included as part of stockholder's gross income).
15. Id
16. See authorities listed in Herman M. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931, 948 n.19 (1979).
17. Prior to the four cases discussed in Part II infra, the Tax Court most recently consid-
ered the tax implications of interest-free loans to majority shareholders in Albert Suttle, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) 1638 (1978). In Suttle, the owner of an automobile dealership over a 35 year
period borrowed money interest-free from the dealership. When the Commissioner at-
tempted to increase the taxpayer's income by an amount measured by the prime interest
rate, the Tax Court summarily followed Dean and excluded this amount from gross income.
Id at 1639.
18. 1973-2 C.B. 4.
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reconsidered and narrowed its decision in Dean.'9
II. RECENT TAx COURT DECISIONS Focus ON THE ISSUES
The Tax Court has recently rendered decisions evidencing its con-
cern for the potential abuse of interest-free loans. In Herman M. Green-
spun,20 Howard Hughes gave low-interest loans to a Las Vegas
newspaper publisher in return for favorable press coverage.2' In the
most recent case, Charles . Marsh II,22 an interest-free loan was given
as consideration for part of a purchase agreement for an oil and gas
contract.' Both Max Zager4 and Joseph CreeP involved the classic
Dean situation in which controlling shareholders obtained interest-free
loans from their corporations.26
19. Charles E. Marsh II, 73 T.C. 317 (1979); Joseph Creel, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979); Max
Zager, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979); Herman M. Greenspun, 72 T.C. 931 (1979).
20. 72 T.C. 931 (1979). Judge Fay wrote the majority opinion. Judges Dawson and
Goffe filed concurring opinions. Judge Nims dissented.
21. The loans amounted to four million dollars at an interest rate of 3% per annum for
an eight year term. The term was later extended to 35 years. The court held that granting
the loan at a preferential interest rate represented consideration given by Hughes in ex-
change for favorable press coverage from Greenspun. Id at 943. In accordance with Dean,
the court held that the petitioner realized no taxable income from the receipt of the loan. 1d
at 945. The court recognized that not all interest is deductible and limited its endorsement
of Dean to only those situations in which there is an offsetting interest deduction. Id at 950.
22. 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
23. In Marsh the petitioners, who owned oil and gas leases and had completed success-
ful test drilling, needed funds to finance construction of a treatment facility and to drill
wells. When they were unable to obtain financing, they entered into a purchase agreement
with a public utility company that provided the necessary funds. The purchase contract
provided that the gas company would buy all gas produced at set prices for 20 years. Simul-
taneously, the gas company agreed to loan petitioners up to 12.8 million dollars, advanced in
installments, to enable the necessary construction to take place. The loan was to be repaid
without interest in 54 monthly installments starting six months after deliveries of gas began.
If the purchase agreement were terminated, petitioners agreed to repay the loan in 36
monthly installments with interest added at the prime commercial rate.
The Commissioner argued that petitioners clearly received an economic benefit that
was includable in gross income. However, the court noted the similarity to the factual situa-
tion in Greenspun, in which an interest-free loan was given to a party unrelated to the lender
as additional consideration for entering into a commercial transaction, and the Marsh court
reached its decision in an attempt to create tax parity. Id at 326. The court, however, did
not merely reaffirm Dean; it supported Dean's holding with three new arguments: (1) al-
though the owner of capital is entitled to demand interest, he does not have to invest his
capital in an income-producing activity; (2) in a business transaction arrived at by arms-
length bargaining between unrelated parties, tax implications should be determined from
the parties' agreement; and (3) an economic benefit is not considered income until it is real-
ized. 1d at 327-28.
24. 72 T.C. 1009 (1979).
25. 72 T.C. 1173 (1979).
26. In Max Zager, 72 T.C. 1009 (1979), Judge Raum, writing for the court, followed
Dean and held that the dominant stockholders of a corporation did not realize income when
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While all four cases followed Dean, the court seemed uncomforta-
ble endorsing a loophole that avoids the taxation of the receipt of an
economic benefit. When reconsidering its decision in Dean, the Tax
Court faces the following questions that must be resolved in order to
reach a fair solution to the problem of taxing interest-free loans: (1)
Does the recipient of an interest-free loan realize an economic benefit?
(2) If the economic benefit of an interest-free loan is included in gross
income, should the taxpayer be allowed an offsetting interest deduc-
tion? (3) If the recipient of an interest-free loan is deemed to have re-
ceived interest income and may deduct that interest, should the fiction
be extended to impute interest income to the lending corporation? (4)
What value should be placed on the benefit received froli the interest-
free loan, and when does the recipient of the loan receive that benefit?
A. The Economic Benefit Realizedfrom Interest-Free Loans
When attempting to assign income to the recipient of an interest-
free loan, the Commissioner has consistently argued that the economic
benefit derived from the free 'use of money is the same as that derived
from the rent-free use of other corporate assets, such as a house or a
boat, which benefits have been held to be includable in gross income. 7
Judge Fay, writing for the majority in Greenspun, conceded that the
"use of funds absent a corresponding obligation to pay interest, or to
receiving interest-free corporate loans. Relying on the strong policy of stare decisis, the
court overturned the Commissioner's determination that the economic benefit of the free use
of $88,988.30 in corporate funds should be measured by the prime rate charged by area
banks and taxed accordingly. Id at 1014. In Joseph Creel, 72 T.C. 1173 (1979), the taxpay-
ers were the sole shareholders, officers and salaried employees of three corporations. Peti-
tioner Creel borrowed funds to pay personal obligations through open accounts, with
monthly balances in 1973 and 1974 ranging from $158,312 to $81,538. Petitioner Parkinson
also borrowed extensively from the three corporations, with balances ranging from a high of
$119,974 to a low of $28,377. Neither petitioner paid interest for the use of these funds.
Judge Sterrett, writing for the court, recognized that there would have been an offsetting
interest deduction had petitioners procured interest-bearing loans. The court therefore re-
fused to hold that "the mere loan of money interest free creates income to the bor-
rower. . . ." Id at 1179. The court, however, noted that during the same period that
petitioners received their loans, one of the lending corporations owed third-party creditors
large sums of money that were personally guaranteed by the petitioners. The court con-
cluded that the corporation was in effect borrowing funds and paying interest as petitioners'
agent. Id The court held that to the extent the corporation borrowed money and paid inter-
est on petitioners' behalf, petitioners received dividend income and were deemed to have
paid interest. Id at 1180.
27. See International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970) (rent-free use of corporate house);
Challenge Mfg. Co., 37 T.C. 650 (1962) (rent-free use of corporate boat); Rodgers Dairy Co.,
14 T.C. 66 (1950) (rent-free use of corporate automobile).
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pay interest only at a preferential rate, . . . constitutes as valuable an
economic benefit as would any rent-free use of a residence, automobile,
or boat."2
A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, Mason v. United States,29
supports the view that an interest-free loan gives rise to a taxable bene-
fit. In Mason the taxpayer sold property at its fair market value to a
charity. The charity paid a small amount of cash and executed a long
term promissory note for the balance. The interest on the note was set
at a low rate, causing the fair market value of the note to be substan-
tially lower than its face amount. The court held that the taxpayer had
made a tax deductible gift of the value of the interest that the taxpayer
had foregone, measured by the difference between the fair market
value of the property sold and the fair market value of the note and
cash received.30
However, in Marsh,3' the court was not willing to concede that the
petitioners had received an economic benefit includable in gross in-
come when they received an interest-free loan of 12.8 million dollars,
and stated that "[a]n economic benefit is not usually considered income
until it is realized."'32 The opinion passed quickly over leading cases
that have interpreted gross income to mean all benefits received regard-
less of form, unless specifically excluded,33 and instead focused on the
realization of the benefit. The court concluded that "[h]ere there is no
gain resulting from an exchange of property, payment of indebtedness,
relief from liability, or other profit realized from the completion of a
transaction.
'34
While affirming Dean, the court seemed to recognize the potential
weakness in its rationale. After noting that the case may be appealed,"
the court attempted to base its position on more fundamental argu-
ments. 36 While Crown v. Commissioner37 was not cited, the court's
analysis rested heavily on the underlying assumption of that case that a
person is not required to use his capital in any income-producing activ-
ity.38 However, this argument is more persuasive when an interest-free
28. 72 T.C. at 947.
29. 513 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1975).
30. Id at 30.
31. 73 T.C. 317 (1979).
32. Id at 328 (emphasis added).
33. See note 10 supra.
34. 73 T.C. at 328.
35. I at 327.
36. See note 23 supra.
37. 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978), aft'g 67 T.C. 1060 (1977).
38. See note I Isupra.
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loan is made as a gift within a family than in a business transaction
conducted for profit.
B. The Offsetting Interest Deduction
While the court in Greenspun recognized that there is an economic
benefit accruing to the recipient of an interest-free loan, it reaffirmed
the Dean rationale, noting that if the taxpayer had paid interest, he
would have had an offsetting interest deduction.39 The majority
reached this result by concluding that an interest-free loan from a cor-
poration to an employee or shareholder is economically speaking no
different than the making of a loan on which interest is charged accom-
panied by an increase in compensation or dividends.' Thus, the court
justified its conclusion as an attempt to make the tax results for the
taxpayer who receives an interest-free loan the same as for the taxpayer
who borrows funds in an arms-length transaction, receives additional
compensation to cover his expenses and then deducts that interest.41
However, when trying to equalize the tax results for the person
who receives extra compensation and then is given a deduction for the
interest paid, the court may have been focusing on the wrong compari-
son. In fact, an inequity remains when the tax results for one who re-
ceives an interest-free loan are compared with the results for one who
must borrow that money in an arms-length transaction.42
The majority in Greenspun, while resting its decision on an attempt
39. 72 T.C. at 947.
40. For a discussion of this "two payment transaction," see Keller, The Tax Conse-
quences ofInterest-Free Loansfrom Corporations to Shareholders andfrom Employers to Em-
ployees, 19 B.C.L. Rav. 231 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Keller].
41. 72 T.C. at 948. The court provided the following example:
To illustrate this point, assume that A, an employee of X Co., received as his
only form of compensation an interest-free loan from X Co. in the amount of
$20,000 for a period of 1 year. Further assume the prevailing interest rate at the
time was 5 percent or $1,000 a year. The economic effect of this transaction is the
same as if X Co. had charged A interest at 5 percent on the $20,000 loan, and at the
same time, paid him a salary of $1,000 which A in turn used to pay the interest.
Assuming no other facts, in the second hypothetical A would have gross income
from his salary of $1,000 and an interest deduction of $1,000 or taxable income of
$0. Consistent with this result, in the first hypothetical involving the interest-free
loan, A's taxable income under our holding in Dean would be $0.
Id
42. For example, if A, a cash-basis taxpayer in the 40% tax bracket, borrows $1,000 at
10% for one year, he will pay $100 in interest charges. A will save $40 on his tax bill because
of the $100 deduction for interest expense. Therefore, the net cost of the loan to A is $60. If,
on the other hand, B borrows $1,000 from his employer at no interest, he will incur no
expense under the Dean rule. The net benefit of the interest-free loan is $60. In order to
place taxpayer A and B in equal positions, the $60 net benefit should be included as income
to B.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
to achieve tax parity, noted a potential for disparate tax treatment aris-
ing because certain calculations for deductions are limited by their rela-
tionship to a percentage of the taxpayer's gross income.43 Under
section 213,44 a taxpayer may deduct medical expenses that exceed
three percent of his gross income. Under section 170,4-charitable de-
ductions cannot exceed a certain percentage of the taxpayer's gross in-
come. The person who receives an interest-free loan without it being
reflected in his gross income benefits by having the threshold before
which he may take medical deductions lowered. On the other hand,
this lower gross income results in a lower maximum charitable deduc-
tion. Thus, even in the Dean type of situation in which an offsetting
interest deduction results in a "wash" in terms of the tax on income, the
exclusion of the benefit of the interest-free loan distorts the taxpayer's
gross income that forms the basis for other tax calculations.
The court in Greenspun cited with approval Judge Opper's concur-
ring opinion and Judge Bruce's dissenting opinion in Dean, both of
which noted that the statement that "an interest free loan results in no
taxable gain to the borrower"'46 is much too broad a generalization be-
cause in certain situations interest is not deductible under section 163.:
Thus, the holding in Greenspun is limited to only those situations in
which there would be a deduction if interest were paid.48
The court further stated in Greensfpun that if the taxpayer were
charged with gross income, he could be entitled to an offsetting deduc-
tion under section 163(a), depending on the facts.49 In reaching the
conclusion that an offsetting interest deduction may be appropriate, the
court drew an analogy to Revenue Ruling 73-13,5o which involved an
executive who had been provided personal financial advice by his em-
ployer. In that ruling, the Service concluded that the executive had
received income, to be measured by the value of the professional serv-
43. 72 T.C. at 949.
44. I.R.C. § 213.
45. I.R.C. § 170.
46. 35 T.C. at 1090-92.
47. Under I.R.C. § 265(2), no deduction is allowed for interest paid on an indebtedness
"incurred... to purchase or carry obligations the interest on which is wholly exempt from
...taxes . . . ." I.R.C. § 163(d) limits the amount of interest that is deductible on an
indebtedness incurred to purchase property held for investment. I.R.C. § 264(a)(2) denies a
deduction for interest paid on an indebtedness used to purchase a single-premium life insur-
ance, endowment, or annuity contract. I.R.C. § 267(a)(2) disallows a deduction for interest
paid in certain instances to related taxpayers. In addition, interest deductions are generally
not available to a person who chooses not to itemize his deductions.
48. 72 T.C. at 950.
49. Id at 952 (dictum).
50. 1973-1 C.B. 42.
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ices received, offset by a deduction under section 212.51
It is not clear, however, that the recipient of an interest-free loan
should be entitled to an interest deduction for interest that he has not in
fact paid. Section 163 allows an interest deduction for "all interest paid
or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."52 The decision in
. Loveman & Son Export Corp.53 supports the position that interest
cannot be deducted when it has not in fact been paid. 4 In that case,
the court was faced with the issue of whether an interest-free loan could
be converted into an interest-bearing loan at a later date by the pay-
ment of interest and the taking of an interest deduction. The court held
that it could not, and followed the "general rule-that interest may not
be accrued where there is no obligation to pay interest. .. .
C. Extending the Fiction: Imputing Interest Income
to the Corporation
If the borrower is deemed to have paid interest to the lending cor-
poration when he receives an interest-free loan, then a logical extension
of this fiction seems to be that the corporation has received interest
income.56 Judge Goffe, concurring in Greenspun, recognized the possi-
bility of this imputing of interest income and concluded that such a
change should come from legislative rather than judicial action. 7
There is no precedent for imputing interest income to a corporation
that lends money interest free.5" In cases in which a corporation trans-
ferred the rent-free use of property to a stockholder, the stockholder
51. I.R.C. § 212 allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred for the production of income.
52. I.R.C. § 163(a) (emphasis added). See O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans,
27 VAND. L. Rav. 1085, 1096 (1974); Sneed, Unlabeled Income and Section 483, 17 MAJOR
TAX PLAN. 643, 651-53 (1965).
53. 34 T.C. 776 (1960).
54. See also Howell Turpentine Co., 6 T.C. 364 (1946), rev'don other grounds, 162 F.2d
516 (5th Cir. 1947).
55. 34 T.C. at 805-06.
56. See Keller, supra note 40, at 244-50. Keller comments that the result of using a two
payment transaction is that a tax is imposed on the corporate lender. Thus, when a corpora-
tion pays a shareholder a dividend, and the shareholder pays the corporation interest, the
net result is that the shareholder has increased income and an offsetting deduction, while the
corporation has interest income with no offsetting deduction for dividends paid.
57. 72 T.C. at 955-56. One should note that adding interest income to the corporation's
income may cause it to lose its status as a small business corporation or change its categori-
zation to that of a personal holding company. 72 T.C. at 954. See B. BrrrKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF SHAREHOLDERS & CORPORATIONS 8.20 (4th ed. 1979)
(personal holding companies) and 6.01 (Subchapter S corporations) [hereinafter cited as
BITTKER & EUSTICE].
58. The court in Dean held that interest-free loans result in no interest income to the
1980]
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was deemed to have additional compensation; however, the rental
value of the property was not included as additional income to the cor-
poration. 9
. Valuation Problems and the Timing of the Benefit
When valuing the benefit of the low-interest loan that the taxpayer
received in Greenspun, the Commissioner asserted that the taxpayer re-
alized the total economic benefit for the entire eight-year term of the
loan in the year in which the loan was granted.6 0 Thus, the Commis-
sioner argued that in 1967 when Greenspun received four million dol-
lars at four percent interest, his income was increased by $701,211 for
that year, and in 1969 when the term of the loan was extended to thirty-
five years, his income was increased by $1,536,156.6' This analysis was
rejected by the Tax Court, which declared that "any economic benefit
which may flow from the favorable interest rate is realized ratably over
the term of the loan.'' 62 The court decided that if the recipient of a low-
interest loan were to sell his right to a third party, the sum realized
would be subject to full taxation in the year of the sale; however, this is
not the usual situation in which an interest charge for the use of money
can be allocated to the appropriate years over the term of the loan.63
III. TAXING THE BENEFIT OF INTEREST-FREE LOANS UNDER
CURRENT CASE LAW
While the Tax Court has consistently followed its decision in
Dean, it has also suggested that in certain circumstances it might reach
a different result. Practitioners seeking to make use of interest-free
loans in tax planning should consider the following adverse tax conse-
quences that may arise from the excessive use of interest-free loans: (1)
the interest-free loan may be re-characterized as a constructive divi-
lender. 35 T.C. at 1090 (citing Society Brand Clothers, Inc., 18 T.C. 304 (1962); Brandtjen &
Kluge, Inc., 34 T.C. 416 (1960); and Combs Lumber Co., 41 B.T.A. 339 (1940)).
59. See Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552 (1938).
60. 72 T.C. at 950.
61. d
62. Id at 951.
63. The timing problem also arises in the area of prepaid interest. See Andrew A.
Sandor, 62 T.C. 469 (1974), a ff'dper curium, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976), in which a cash
basis taxpayer borrowed $100,000 from a bank on a note payable on demand or, if no de-
mand was made, at five years after the date made at 71h% interest. The taxpayer prepaid in
one year the entire interest due for the five year term in the amount of $38,041.61 and
attempted to deduct the entire sum. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction under § 446,
holding that the deduction would have materially distorted the taxpayer's taxable income
because the deduction represented approximately 18% of his income for the year.
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dend; (2) the corporation may be assessed an accumulated earnings tax;
(3) if an offsetting deduction is not allowed under section 163, the bene-
fit of the interest-free loan may be included in gross income; and (4) if
the corporation that lends money interest free has large outstanding
debts itself, the corporation may be found to be acting as the share-
holder's agent in obtaining loans and paying interest, and the benefit of
the loan may be considered dividend income to the shareholder.
First, in making excessive use of interest-free loans, the corpora-
tion runs the risk of the whole amount of the loan being found to be a
constructive dividend.' 4 Dolese v. United States65 may indicate a new
willingness by the courts to find adverse tax consequences for interest-
free loans.6 6 Other courts generally have been liberal when sharehold-
ers borrow from a controlled corporation and these courts have toler-
ated shareholders channeling some personal transactions through the
corporation. The court in Dolese, however, stated:
[Whereas withdrawal of reasonable amounts are counte-
nanced as a loan if other loan factors are present, excessive
and continuous diversion of corporate funds into the control-
ling shareholder's pocket takes on a different character.
There is a principle of too much; phrased colloquially, when a
pig becomes a hog it is slaughtered.67
Accordingly, the court held that the entire amount of the interest-free
loan was a constructive dividend and was includable in gross income.68
Second, if a corporation makes large loans, it may red-flag itself as
a likely candidate for the imposition of the accumulated earnings tax,
69
which is imposed on a corporation that accumulates earnings and prof-
its beyond the reasonable needs of the business to avoid income tax.
Third, the Greenspun decision specifically limits its holding of no
taxable income to situations in which there would be an offsetting de-
duction allowable if interest were paid.7" However, in cases in which
the imputed interest would not produce an offsetting deduction, such as
when the loaned money is used by the taxpayer to purchase tax-exempt
64. Cf. Joseph Lupowitz Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 497 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979).
66. In Dolese, a taxpayer took advances in the form of interest-free loans for personal
living expenses in the amount of $1,817,133 over a period of 16 years. While the taxpayer's
gross income was $125,000 annually, the court noted that interest on the outstanding loan
would be $72,000 a year (figured at a modest 4%). Id at 1153.
67. Id at 1154.
68. Id
69. I.R.C. §§ 531-537. See BrrTEc & EusricE, supra note 57, at 8.01.
70. 72 T.C. at 950.
1980]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW.REVIEW
bonds, single premium life insurance, an annuity contract, or property
held for investment,7' the benefit received from the free use of money
may be included in gross income.
Finally, if the corporation that makes loans to its shareholders is
itself heavily indebted to third-party creditors, the court may look to
the substance of the transaction and conclude that the corporation was
borrowing money and paying interest as the shareholder's agent. In
Creel, a case involving shareholders who received interest-free loans
from their wholly-owned corporations, the court distinguished the
loans made by one corporation when that corporation owed large
amounts of money to third party creditors and the debt was personally
guaranteed by the shareholders.72 The shareholders were deemed to
have received dividend income and paid interest to the extent that the
indebted corporation made such interest payments on behalf of the
shareholders.73 While the court found no net tax result from this divi-
dend income,74 the decision still evidences the court's willingness to
look through the form of the interest-free loan transaction and con-
clude that the shareholder received dividend income when he received
an interest-free loan.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
While courts may begin to scrutinize interest-free loans under the
analysis discussed above, it is unlikely that Dean will be specifically
overruled. The Tax Court has consistently maintained its position that
an interest-free loan results in no income tax consequences on the basis
of a policy determination to follow a 60-year span of judicial prece-
dent.75 Several opinions have recently suggested that if a change is
71. See note 47 supra.
72. 72 T.C. at 1179. On December 31, 1973, Gulf Paving, Inc. owed $748,487 to credi-
tors and had outstanding loans to its shareholders of $86,284. On December 31, 1974, Gulf
Paving, Inc. owed $826,418 to creditors and had outstanding loans to its shareholders of
$51,136. Id at 1175-77.
73. 1d at 1180.
74. Id
75. The interest-free loan used in Dean reflected a practice that had been unchallenged
from the beginning of our modem income tax law in 1913 to 1961 when the question was
first raised as an "afterthought." The issue of taxing the benefit from the interest-free loan
as income was not raised in the original deficiency. It was raised in an amended answer and
appeared to be in response to a memorandum opinion of the Tax Court involving the same
taxpayers. The court stated: "Viewed realistically, the lending of over two million dollars to
petitioners without interest might be looked upon as a means of passing on earnings (cer-
tainly potential earnings) of Nemours in lieu of dividends, to the extent of a reasonable
interest on such loans . . . ." Pauline DuPont Dean, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 281, 288 (1960).
Indeed, even after the adverse decision in Dean, the Government did not appeal the result,
[Vol. 13
1980] INTEREST-FREE LOANS
necessary it should come from Congress rather than through unneces-
sarily broad judicial interpretation.76
When formulating a legislative proposal to determine the income
tax consequences of an interest-free loan to the recipient, an appropri-
ate starting point is to examine the relationship between the lender and
the borrower. An interest-free loan from one family member to an-
other will not be a taxable event for the recipient because of the exclu-
sion of gifts from income tax.77 However, the donor may be subject to
gift tax on the value of the use of the money when the loan is for a fixed
term.7" Outside the family context, where receipt of an interest-free
loan cannot usually be classified as a gift,7 9 the benefit derived from the
use of the interest-free loan should be subject to taxation as income.
This comment suggests two legislative proposals that focus on the rela-
tionship of the lender and the borrower. First, section 482 should be
extended to individuals who are found to "control" their corporations
to cover shareholders who receive loans from their corporations and
use such loans to distort their income. Second, the receipt of compen-
sation in the form of a loan from an employer to an employee should
be taxed under the criteria established for taxing fringe benefits.
and it was not until 1973 that the Commissioner announced his non-acquiescence. 1973-2
C.B. 4.
76. Given the long-standing precedent of Dean, Judge Raum, writing for the court in
Max Zager, concluded that if a change is necessary it should be accomplished by the legisla-
ture rather than the judiciary. 72 T.C. at 1014.
This call for a legislative solution was echoed in Judge Goffe's concurring opinion in
Greenspun, in which he found support from Justice Powell's opinion in United States v.
Byrum:
Courts properly have been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of tax law
which has been generally accepted when the departure could have potentially far-
reaching consequences. When a principle of taxation requires reexamination,
Congress is better equipped than a court to define precisely the type of conduct
which results in tax consequences. When courts readily undertake such tasks, tax-
payers may not rely with assurance on what appear to be established rules lest they
be subsequently overturned. Legislative enactments, on the other hand, although
not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the taxpayers advance warning.
72 T.C. at 955-56 (quoting United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 135 (1972)).
77. I.R.C. § 102(a) provides: "Gross income does not include the value of property ac-
quired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
78. See Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978) (taxpayer who loaned
money to family members as demand notes, in interest-free loans and payable accounts, not
required to include the value of foregone interest in taxable gift computation). See note 11
supra.
79. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (characterization of gift
as motivated by "detached and disinterested generosity").
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A. The Controlling Shareholder. Reallocation of Income and
Deductions under Section 482
Almost from the inception of our modem tax system, Congress has
recognized the potential problems created by interest-free loans and
has attempted to prevent related taxpayers from reducing their com-
bined taxes by arbitrarily shifting elements affecting taxes among them-
selves.80 Section 482 authorizes the Commissioner to allocate gross
income and deductions among two or more commonly owned or con-
trolled entities if such allocation is necessary either to prevent an eva-
sion of taxes or to reflect income clearly.8' Thus, the use of section 482
has three conditions: (1) the taxpayer entities must be organizations,
trades, or businesses; (2) the operation of these entities must be con-
trolled by the same interests; and (3) the reallocation must be necessary
to prevent tax evasion or to reflect income accurately.
8 2
While it is clear that by its terms, section 482 is not generally ap-
plicable to dealings between a corporation and an individual share-
holder, some courts have been willing to stretch its language to reach
the individual, when the section's purposes would thereby be served.
83
However, the better approach would be for the legislature to expand
the scope of section 482 to reach individuals by its terms.
80. The forerunner of I.R.C. § 482 was § 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921, which
authorized the Commissioner to consolidate the accounts of related trades or businesses in
order to accurately reflect their income. I.R.C. § 482 is substantially the same as § 45 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
For a brief legislative history of § 482, see Hewitt, Section 482-Allocation of Income
and Deductions Among Related Taxpayers, 20 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX 463 (1962).
81. I.R.C. § 482 states:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Sec-
retary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he deter-
mines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organiza-
tions, trades, or businesses.
82. Id
83. In Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968), a professional entertainer
was the sole owner of a corporation that conducted a poultry business at a loss. He con-
tracted with the corporation to perform entertainment services for five years at a salary of
$50,000 per year. In this manner, the corporation offset the poultry losses against the high
entertainment profits. The Tax Court upheld under section 482 the allocation to the enter-
tainer of a portion of compensation received by the corporation for entertainment services
performed by Borge. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that for purposes of I.R.C.
§ 482, Borge controlled two businesses, an entertainment business and a poultry business,
and the income of Borge's two businesses had been distorted when "the sole purpose of the
arrangement was to permit [the corporation] to offset losses from the poultry business with
income from the entertainment business." Id at 677.
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If the Commissioner may allocate income to individuals as well as
organizations, trades, or businesses under section 482, two critical is-
sues that arise in each situation are whether interest-free loans have
been used to distort income and avoid taxation, and whether the indi-
vidual shareholder who receives such a loan has a controlling interest
in a corporation. When the shareholder. has a controlling interest, he
can manipulate funds to divert the interest-free use of money to his
personal use. If this interest-free loan distorts the income of the indi-
vidual shareholder or evades taxes, the rationale of section 482 requires
a reallocation of this interest as income. 4 The criterion for determin-
ing sufficient control by a shareholder to satisfy the section has been
left intentionally vague to allow the Commissioner greater flexibility of
administration;85 however, a majority shareholder who receives an in-
terest-free loan would certainly be found to have sufficient control of
that corporation.
While the Tax Court has attempted to limit the scope of section
482, circuits that have considered the issue have supported the Com-
missioner's broad power to allocate income as long as correlative ad-
justments are made.86 However, it must be noted that the imposition of
84. The legislative history indicates that Congress passed § 482 in order to prevent the
tax evasions that occurred by shifting profits, making fictitious sales or using other methods
frequently adopted for "milking." S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1928).
85. See Plumb & Kapp, Reallocation of Income and Deductions under § 482, 41 TAXES
809, 811 (1963).
86. While any detailed analysis of§ 482 is beyond the scope of this article, it is helpful to
note how the courts have dealt with the problem of imputing interest among commonly
controlled corporations. Early attempts at allocating income under § 482 were frustrated
because courts narrowly construed the section's application. In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel
Co. v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1940), one corporation allowed a related corpo-
ration to use equipment rent-free. The Commissioner increased the income of the corpora-
tion whose equipment had been used by the amount of rent it would have received in an
arms-length agreement, but did not reduce the other corporation's income by the amount of
rent that would have been paid. The Sixth Circuit held that the Commissioner had ex-
ceeded his authority under § 482, and "set up income where none existed." Id at 510. See
also Smith-Bridgman & Co., 16 T.C. 287 (1951), acq. 1951-I C.B. 3.
In B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934
(1972), two competing department stores set up a third corporation for the purpose of build-
ing a shopping mall to connect the two stores. Each store owned 50% of the stock of the
"mall" corporation, and each made a loan of one million dollars to the controlled corpora-
tion interest-free. Pursuant to § 482, the Commissioner increased the income of each store
by five percent to reflect interest income. The Tax Court disallowed the application of§ 482,
based on a determination that neither corporation had control of the third corporation. Id
at 1150. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that § 482 should be broadly construed and
that interest should be imputed in order to comport with "economic reality." Id at 1156.
Responding to the reasoning in Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel and a number of other cases, the
court stated: "Those cases may be correct from a pure accounting standpoint. Nevertheless,
interest income may be added to taxpayers' incomes, as long as correlative adjustment is
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the effects of section 482 may be a severe sanction and the Commis-
sioner's power should be narrowly drawn to permit such action only in
those situations in which it is clear that such an allocation is necessary
to prevent evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly.
B. Employee Compensation: Taxing the Interest-Free Loan as a
Fringe Benoft
The taxation of the benefit of an interest-free loan given to an em-
ployee87 should be governed by the criteria set forth for the taxation of
other fringe benefits. Congress is currently reviewing the tax treatment
of fringe benefits,"8 and it is appropriate that Congress review the treat-
ment of interest-free loans as fringe benefits at the same time. On Feb-
ruary 15, 1979, the Task Force on Employee Fringe Benefits of the
House Ways and Means Committee submitted its discussion draft bill
and report.8 9 The Task Force emphasized general concepts and issues
made to. . .[the recipient of the loan], for then the true taxable income of all involved will
be properly reflected." Id
In Latham Park Manor, Inc., 69 T.C. 199 (1977), the Tax Court reconsidered its earlier
position that interest income may not be allocated to the lending corporation when the bor-
rowed funds do not generate income. See Kerry Investment Co., 58 T.C. 479 (1972), a 'din
part & rev'd in part, 500 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974); Kahler Corp., 58 T.C. 496 (1972), rev'd,
486 F.2d I (8th Cir. 1973). In Latham, two subsidiaries borrowed 2.1 million dollars from a
third party at 10% per annum, and then made interest-free loans to the parent corporation
totaling $625,982.64. These loans were used primarily by the parent corporation to resolve a
legal suit and were not used to generate income. In holding that § 482 permits the allocation
of interest income even though the parent corporation did not use the loan to produce in-
come, the Tax Court found Treas. Regs. §§ 1.482-1(d)(4) and 1A82-2(a)(1) (1968) to be con-
trolling. Id at 215-16. Thus, these recent decisions indicate a broader application of § 482
by the Tax Court.
87. Whenever an interest-free loan is determined to have been given as compensation,
even if no formal employer-employee relationship exists, the benefit of that loan should be
taxed as a fringe benefit. Under this reasoning, the benefit of the loan given in Greenspun
would be taxed as a fringe benefit, since it was determined to have been given as compensa-
tion.
88. In 1975, the Treasury Department issued a discussion draft of proposed regulations
for the tax treatment of fringe benefits. Opponents to the draft argued that the policy re-
garding fringe benefits was of such long standing duration that it had achieved the force of
law, and any policy changes should be made instead by the Legislature. The discussion
draft was withdrawn on December 28, 1976. In 1977, Congress began considering the taxa-
tion of fringe benefits. A bill was passed that prevented the issuance of new regulations
relating to fringe benefits prior to July 1, 1978. This date has been extended twice, and
current law prohibits the promulgation of fringe benefit regulations before June 1, 1981. Act
of Dec. 28, 1979, Pun. L. No. 96-167, § 1, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979).
For a general discussion of fringe benefits and the discussion draft of treasury regula-
tions that was withdrawn, see Warble, Taxation of Fringe Benets and Perquisites, 36 N.Y.U.
INsT. FED. TAx 693 (1978); Comment, Federal Income Taxation ofEmployee Fringe Benefts,
89 HARv. L. REv. 1141 (1976).
89. TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS, HousE WAYS & MEANS COMM.,
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rather than attempting to prescribe the tax treatment for every specific
type of fringe benefit. The discussion draft bill provides five alternative
tests by which a fringe benefit may be excluded from gross income: (1)
a general guidelines test, (2) a convenience-of-the-employer test,90 (3) a
de minimus test, (4) any other existing statutory provision applicable to
fringe benefits, or (5) future regulations prescribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury.91
It is doubtful that interest-free loans would be excludable from
gross income under any of the tests outlined in the discussion draft bill,
except that very small loans could be excludable under the de minimus
test. Under the general guidelines test, the benefit would have to be
made available to employees generally, provided at no incremental cost
to the employer, and the benefit could not be substantial in either abso-
lute terms or in comparison to the employee's total compensation.92
The interest-free loan that is typically made to the high-level executive
seems to be exactly the type of exclusive benefit that the bill is aimed at
taxing.
93
While the Treasury would be given authority to promulgate new
regulations that provide tax exempt status for fringe benefits consistent
with the purposes of this bill,94 it seems likely that interest-free loans
would not fall in the category of socially desirable benefits exempted
from taxation under existing statutory provisions, such as qualified
pension plans, group term life insurance, or medical benefits,95 scholar-
ships, 96 and group legal services.97 Therefore, the benefit of the inter-
est-free loan given to an employee as a fringe benefit should be
includable in his gross income as compensation and subject to taxation.
96TH CONG., lST SESS., DISCUSSION DRAFT BILL & REPORT ON EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENE-
FITS (Comm. Print 1979), reprinted in [1979] STAND. FED. TAX. REP. (CCH) 6156.
90. The convenience-of-the-employer test would not be appropriate for excluding the
benefit of interest-free loans. This exclusion is for a benefit which is made available prima-
rily for the purpose of facilitating the employee's performance of services for the employer,
and may include such benefits as office equipment, secretarial support, and a company car
used strictly for business. Id at 9-10.
91. Id at 15-18.
92. Id
93. While no direct reference is made to interest-free loans, it should be noted that in its
conclusion, the report notes that transitional relief should be considered when there has been
a reasonable reliance upon favorable decisions or rulings. Id at 14.
94. Id at 11.
95. I.R.C. § 106.
96. Id § 117.
97. Id § 120.
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V. CONCLUSION
Recent case law has indicated that the Tax Court is unwilling to
move quickly to change the favorable tax treatment given to interest-
free loans. There is, however, a growing concern within the judiciary
when excessively large loans escape taxation, as evidenced by Justice
Van Pelt's dissenting opinion in Crown v. Commissioner,9" in which no
gift tax consequences were applied to an 18 million dollar interest-free
loan. Justice Van Pelt concluded simply that it "just ain't right." 99 To
correct the inequity created when large interest-free loans transfer the
beneficial use of money without taxation, Congress should specifically
include such loans when it acts on fringe benefits. Moreover, Congress
should expand section 482 to bring individuals within its coverage, and
thus allow the Commissioner to allocate income and deductions be-
tween an individual shareholder and his controlled corporation when
such loans create a distortion of income or are used to evade taxes.
Jan Elizabeth Eakins
98. 585 F.2d 234, 241 (7th Cir. 1978).
99. Id at 242.
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